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I. Introduction 
The government has an extremely strong interest in protecting the market 
integrity for nationally traded securities. Events in American history, such 
as the Great Depression and the collapse in stock prices that preceded it, 
have shown what economic turmoil can result from relaxed regulation. In 
response, the United States federal government and almost all states have 
enacted securities or “blue-sky” legislation that impose civil and/or criminal 
penalties for failure to comply with statutory requirements.
1
 These laws 
include the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Securities Act of 1933, 
and other federal and state legislation.  
Following the stock market crash which preceded the Great Depression, 
Congress recognized that the public had little to no confidence in the 
securities market. In order to reestablish public confidence, and with the 
ultimate goal of recovering the economy, Congress took action.
2
 Congress 
enacted the Securities Act as a response to these largely unregulated 
investment markets where serious abuses occurred. As part of that same 
effort, Congress enacted the Securities Exchange Act a year later in 1934. 
This act established the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”). The 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Jonathan Macey & Geoffrey Miller, Origin of the Blue Sky Laws, 70 TEX. L. REV. 
347, 348 (1991). 
 2. The importance of a fair and trustworthy market cannot be overstated. As SEC 
Chairman William Casey once said, “we must never forget that we are dealing with a 
priceless asset, the repository of the retirement hopes and educational aspirations of millions 
of Americans, a unique barometer of our economic health and engine of our economic 
progress. What does it take for our markets to achieve these great purposes. The markets 
themselves must have characteristics of liquidity and sensitivity to economic reality. They 
must be honest and fair and orderly. The public must have confidence that those 
characteristics prevail. Broad public participation is essential to liquidity. Full disclosure is 
essential to public confidence.” 
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2018] The Death of the Joint Venture Exemption 1311 
 
 
SEC holds the primary responsibilities of enforcing federal securities laws, 
recommending securities rules, and regulating the securities industry.
3
 
The purpose of both acts was to regulate investments in whatever form 
they came in, regardless of the name brokers attached to the instruments.
4
 
To achieve that goal, Congress painted with a broad brush when defining 
“security” recognizing the endless scope of potential investment schemes 
that individuals could develop in the future.
5
  This sweeping definition has 
allowed the SEC to pursue charges against investment interests that fall 
outside of the typically thought of stock certificate. 
One of the most central elements of compliance with securities laws 
includes the registration of investment scheme managers as brokers with the 
relevant agency. Agencies, such as the SEC, require registration of certain 
individuals to ensure that they are fully complying with securities law. 
Registration better enables the SEC to monitor both brokers and dealers of 
securities, thereby protecting the everyday purchaser of stock. While 
federal securities law requires registration for many individuals engaged in 
the process of selling investment interests, these pieces of legislation often 
are subject to exemptions that serve as a defense for failure to comply with 
statutory requirements. While some of these exemptions are statutorily-
based, others arise out of common law. One common exemption to 




This article focuses on federal securities regulation, including 
compliance with the SEC under the Securities Act and the Securities 
Exchange Act. More specifically, this paper endeavors to cover whether an 
oil and gas investment operation that claims to be a joint venture can still be 
exempt from registration with the SEC in the face of recent case law. 
Attorneys and market participants alike are often surprised to find out that 
many oil and gas interests are actually securities. As a result, securities laws 
can ensnare investment promoters in litigation battles with the SEC or state 
agencies. The business of oil and gas investments is a unique enterprise. 
The process of funding, placing, and drilling a well followed by the 
production of minerals is no simple task. The complicated oil and gas 
                                                                                                                 
 3. U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION: “WHAT WE DO,” https://www.sec. 
gov/Article/whatwedo.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2017).  
 4. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 58-59 (1990). 
 5. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946). 
 6. The terms “joint venture” and “general partnership” are interchangeable and 
describe the organization of a business venture where an undertaking between two 
individuals or companies occurs for the purpose of carrying out a particular project. 
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development process has developed into a specialized industry. Further, 
with the needs for energy production only increasing year by year, this 
massive industry is here to stay. Expectedly, as with many investment 
operations, the SEC has kept a close eye on these schemes in order to 
protect the everyday investor.
7
  
In the oil and gas industry, courts have applied the definition of a 
security in broad terms, to include virtually every type of oil and gas 
investment that can be created.
8
 Therefore, exemptions are often an 
important mechanism used by investment managers to avoid registration 
with the relevant governing agency. In SEC v. Kinlaw Secs., the 
Commission sought to charge Kinlaw for offering oil and gas securities 
without registering with the SEC.
9
 Kinlaw argued that the organization was 
a general partnership, and thus exempt from registering their managing 
venturers as brokers.
10
 The court allowed Kinlaw to use the general 
partnership exemption, holding that the SEC failed to meet its heavy burden 
of establishing that the joint venture interests were in fact securities.
11
 In the 
after math of this case, many oil and gas promoters tried to use their 
apparent status as a general partnership as a defense.
12
 This practice has led 




This paper pursues the objective of informing both oil and gas 
investment operators, as well as the attorneys representing these parties, 
                                                                                                                 
 7. James Osborne, Investment Fraud is Booming Along with Oil and Gas Drilling, 
SEC Says, DALLAS NEWS (Jan. 2014), https://www.dallasnews.com/business/energy/ 
2014/01/04/investment-fraud-is-booming-along-with-oil-and-gas-drilling-sec-says. 
 8. SEC v. Arcturus Corp., 171 F. Supp. 3d 512, 521 (N.D. Tex. 2016). 
 9. 254 F.3d 1080 (5th Cir. 2001). 
 10. Id.  
 11. Id.  
 12. The promoters charged in the Kinlaw case later shut down their Texas investments 
that the litigation was centered on and moved to Colorado. There, the promoters started a 
new development company known as HEI Resources, or Heartland Energy. The company 
and its promoters are currently involved in state securities litigation surrounding oil and gas 
operations. The state has alleged that the promoters have lost over $68 million dollars in 
investment funds following practices of offering high commissions and targeting drilling 
areas known to be dry. See Aldo Svaldi, Colorado Began Investigating HEI Resources for 
Securities Violation in 2002. It Just Scored a Major Victory in the Case, THE DENVER POST 
(Jan. 2018), https://www.denverpost.com/2018/01/17/hei-resources-colorado-oil-gas-
securities-violations. 
 13. SEC v. Mieka Energy Corp., 259 F. Supp. 3d 556 (E.D. Tex. 2017); Arcturus, 171 
F. Supp. 3d at 512; SEC v. Sethi Petroleum, LLC, 229 F. Supp. 3d 524 (E.D. Tex. 2017); 
SEC v. Couch, No. 3:14–CV–1747–D, 2014 WL 7404127 (N.D. Tex. 2014). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol3/iss6/2
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about the erosion of the joint venture exemption in the oil and gas 
investment arena by examining the history of regulation in the field and 
providing context from new case law. More specifically, Part II of this 
paper provides background on the history of oil and gas securities and the 
SEC’s regulation of these instruments. Part III offers discussion on the 
potential liability of an oil and gas operation under current securities law. 
Part IV examines the use of the joint venture exemption in the oil and gas 
industry. This section includes how federal courts have determined liability 
under the Howey test and further establishment of the Williamson factors 
applied to the third prong of the Howey test. Finally, Part V proposes advice 
for attorneys on how to handle the recent changes in oil and gas securities 
law, and how to adequately advise clients on securities issues they may 
have as they relate to oil and gas.  
II. A Background on Oil and Gas Securities Regulation  
A. Legislative History 
The initial version of the Securities Act of 1933 contained within the 
definition of a security any “certificate of interest in any oil, gas, or mining 
lease.”
14
 As the preliminary bill was passed between the House and Senate, 
slight variations of the same phrase were used.
15
 The House Report on the 
final bill signed into law defined “security” broadly so as to encompass the 
many concepts in the market that fall within the ordinary concept of a 
security.
16
 The report further emphasized that “[t]he definition is broad 
enough to include as securities, for example, certificates of interest in oil, 
gas, or mining leases or royalties.”
17
  
The following year, section 2(1) of the Act was amended by the Security 
Exchange Act of 1934. The modifications deleted the language “certificate 
of interest in property, tangible and intangible” and an amendment added 
“certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, 
or other mineral rights.”
18
 The final definition provided that “[t]he term 
‘security’ means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, certificate 
of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement or in any oil, gas, 
                                                                                                                 
 14. Securities Act of 1933, S. 875, 73d Cong., § 2 (1st Sess. 1933). 
 15. Peter Reilly & Christopher Heroux, When Should Interests in Oil and Gas Be 
Considered Securities?: A Case For the Industry Deal, 34 S. TEX. L. REV. 37, 42 (1993).  
 16. H.R. REP. NO. 85, 73d (1933). 
 17. Id.  
 18. H.R. REP. NO. 9323 (1933). 
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or other mineral royalty or lease. . .”
19
 The conference report further stated 
that the purpose of the amendment was to make clear that “certificate[s] of 
deposit, fractional oil royalty, or leasehold interests and interests of a 
similar character are included within the definition of a security and thus 
subject to the Securities Act.”
20
 
B. The Role of Texas Federal Courts  
The state of Texas has produced some of the most influential oil and gas 
case law in the United States. Texas’s history as a leader in oil and gas has 
given Texas courts the opportunity to shape the field of law governing the 
industry. Whereas Texas courts produce a lot of case law concerning the 
practice of oil and gas generally, the federal district courts have been 
extremely influential on oil and securities law nationally. Much of the case 
law discussed in this comment concerns litigation that has occurred in 
either Texas federal district courts or the Fifth Circuit. While oil and gas 
securities litigation is centered in this region, much of the case law has 
influenced other federal courts in different parts of the country. Just as 
previous oil and gas cases have served as persuasive sources of law, these 
oil and gas securities cases discussed are creating a wealth of common law 
on which many other jurisdictions rely. 
C. Federal Courts as an SEC Forum 
When seeking to enforce securities regulations, the SEC has two options 
for initiating the litigation of an enforcement action.
21
 The SEC can either 
bring an action administratively in front of a SEC Administrative Law 
Judge (“ALJ”) or in a federal district court.
22
 This comment delves into the 
case law created by the SEC’s litigation of illegal investment activities in 
federal courts.  When a case requires emergency attention, the SEC will 
generally file cases in federal court instead of through an administrative 
proceeding. Emergency relief, such as asset freezes or temporary 
restrictions in general orders, can only be granted by a federal court and not 
by an ALJ.
23
 Whereas litigation can move relatively quickly, administrative 
proceedings are infamous for their slowness in processing claims. Another 
reason the SEC chooses to litigate in federal courts is that the agency views 
                                                                                                                 
 19. 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1988). 
 20. H.R. REP. NO. 1838 (1934) (Conf. Rep.). 
 21. Clifford Alexander and Arthur Delibert, Litigating With the SEC: Choice of Forum, 
MONEY MANAGER’S COMPLIANCE GUIDE, ¶ 1030 (2015).  
 22. Id.  
 23. Id. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol3/iss6/2
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a federal court injunction as more significant than an administrative cease-
and-desist order granted by an ALJ. The reason for this distinction is that an 
injunction, once violated, is enforceable by an action made for contempt of 
court.
24
 Thus, violators can be subject to strict sanctions, including prison 
time. In contrast, an administrative order requires a federal court order to 
enforce it in the case of a breach. 
Another reason the SEC files certain cases in federal court is that the 
discovery rights available to the agency are more extensive than the 
research opportunities available in an administrative proceeding.
25
 These 
extensive discovery rights allow the SEC to uncover more details about the 
inter-workings of investment schemes. With more discovery rights, the 
SEC has been able to shape case law in securities regulation, specifically as 
applied to quasi-joint ventures in the oil and gas industry. These extensive 
discovery rights are the reason the SEC has been able to not only push the 
production of case law concerning the joint venture in oil and gas 
investments, but also why they are able to keep winning cases. Detailed 
discovery has allowed the SEC to carve out a number of factors that the 
Commission believes are the mark of an operation that does not qualify as a 
joint venture. As is explained later, the SEC has been able to scrutinize 
agreements of particular importance to the oil and gas industry, such as 
joint venture agreements and private placement memorandums. 
D. Oil and Gas Interests as Securities  
There are two means of analysis by which an oil and gas interest can be 
defined a security under federal law. First, an oil and gas interest might be 
considered security under the portion of the law that expressly defines 
certain oil, gas, and other mineral interests as securities.
26
 Alternatively, an 
oil and gas interest might be considered a security due to its status as an 
investment contract.
27
 While this comment focuses on the latter 
classification of oil and gas interests, it is important to note that the SEC 
has other avenues that it can use to attack an investment operation.  
 As to the first option, the Securities Act includes any “fractional 
undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights” in the definition of a 
security.
28
 Further, the Exchange Act includes “participation in . . . any oil, 
                                                                                                                 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id.  
 26. Nelson S. Ebaugh, Remedies for Defrauded Purchasers of Oil and Gas Interests 
Under the Securities Laws, 1 TEX. J. OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 51, 53 (2006).  
 27. Id.  
 28. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (2006). 
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gas, or other mineral royalty or lease” in the definition of a security.
29
 
While these definitions differ slightly, courts have harmonized these two 
acts by mostly ignoring the Exchange Act definition.
30
 The outcome has 
been that an oil and gas interest is a security if it is a fractional undivided 
interest in an oil or gas mineral right.
31
  
 Case law provides that courts should first determine whether an oil 
and gas interest is a fractional undivided interest in oil and gas.
32
 If an 
interest does not fit within this definition, the court then may determine if 




III. Liability of Oil and Gas Investment Operations  
This comment will discuss the liability of oil and gas investment 
operations that seek to identify as general partnerships or joint ventures, and 
thus do not register their managing venturers as brokers with the SEC. 
There are only two types of securities: those that require registration and 
those that are exempt from registration. This idea illustrates that an 
instrument that is a security must be registered in accordance with security 
laws unless it has exempt status.
34
  
While oil and gas securities fraud has been around as long as the industry 
itself, recent booms in the industry caused proliferation of the number of 
securities fraud cases. The SEC has brought an increasing amount of cases 
each year against fraudulent investment operations. The SEC generally does 
not have jurisdiction over investment operations that function as joint 
ventures.
35
 The agency lacks jurisdiction because courts consider the 
investors in these operations to be more similar to partners than merely 
blind participants.
36
 However, the SEC has recently charged several oil and 
gas investment operations with setting up illusory joint ventures that, in 
reality, function as a typical investment operations.
37
 In these misleading 
“joint venture” operations, the securities promoter will get most of the 
                                                                                                                 
 29. Id. 
 30. Reilly & Heroux, supra note 15, at 46. 
 31. Adena Exploration, Inc. v. Sylvan, 860 F.2d 1242, 1252-53 (5th Cir. 1988); Nor-
Tex, Agencies, Inc. v. Jones, 482 F.2d 1093, 1097-98 (5th Cir. 1973). 
 32. Reves, 494 U.S. at 61; Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 686 (1985). 
 33. Id.  
 34. Ebaugh, supra note 26, at 53. 
 35. Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 421 (5th Cir. 1981). 
 36. Id.  
 37. Arcturus, 171 F. Supp. 3d at 520; Sethi, 229 F. Supp. 3d at 530. 
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money invested and is not incentivized to further investor prospects because 
they receive payment whether or not a well pays out. These cases illustrate 
a reoccurring theme of investment operators seeking to classify their 
operations as exempt from registration, when in fact registration is required.  
The distinction between a partner, someone participating in a joint 
venture, and a shareholder, a less sophisticated investor, is significant for an 
investment company. The process of registering a security with the SEC is 
a costly and often rigorous activity.
38
 Further, the penalties for breaching 
anti-fraud laws are far more stringent for investments that the SEC deems 
are securities.
39
 Therefore, oil and gas promoters may seek to avoid 
registration with the SEC by structuring an investment scheme as a joint 
venture. 
IV. The Use of the Joint Venture Exemption in Oil and Gas 
A. Liability Under the Howey Test 
The Securities Act intentionally gives a broad definition of the term 
security, so as to ensure that any instrument that might be sold as an 
investment is covered.
40
 The definition is sufficiently broad enough to 
encompass almost any instrument that may be sold or purchased as an 
investment.
41
 The Securities Act of 1933 includes in the definition of a 
security any “fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral 
rights.”
42
 The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 includes in its definition 
“participation in . . . any oil, gas, or other mineral royalty or lease.”
43
 While 
these two definitions differ slightly in their classification of oil and gas 
interest; courts have interpreted the two in accord to mean the same thing.
44
 
These definitions also include the term ‘investment contract’, but it is not 
defined by either the Securities nor the Exchange Act. In SEC v. W.J. 
Howey Co., the Supreme Court defined an investment contract as “a 
contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a 
                                                                                                                 
 38. Alexander & Delibert, supra note 21, at ¶ 210. 
 39. Id.  
 40. Reves, 494 U.S. at 61. 
 41. Howey, 328 U.S. at 293. 
 42. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2006). 
 43. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (2006). 
 44. Landreth, 471 U.S. at 686. 
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common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of a 
promoter or a third party.”
45
 
The Howey analysis provides a three-prong test for determining whether 
an investment scheme is an “investment contract.” The test requires that 
there be “(1) an investment of money; (2) in a common enterprise; and (3) 
on an expectation of profits to be derived solely from the efforts of 
individuals other than the investor.”
46
 The first two factors which consider 
whether there is an investment in a common enterprise are almost always 
met in the cases that raise issue before the courts. Therefore, the analysis in 
each case often comes down to the third and final factor concerning the 
expectation of profits.  
The Fifth Circuit held in Williamson v. Tucker that the term “solely” is to 
be interpreted in a flexible, rather than a literal, manner.
47
 In determining 
whether parties expect profits to come “solely” from the efforts of others, 
the Fifth Circuit adopted the Ninth Circuit’s test, which asks whether the 
efforts made by individuals other than the investor are the significant ones 
which affect the success or failure of the enterprise.
48
 The Williamson case 
further provides that the third Howey factor is established if the partnership 
can be characterized by partners that that are “so dependent on a particular 
manager that they cannot replace him or otherwise exercise ultimate 
control.”
49
 Following the Williamson case, courts consider three factors 
when determining whether the partners are so dependent on the efforts of 
another that the scheme is actually an investment contract: 
(1) An agreement among the parties leaves so little power in the 
hands of the partner or venture that the arrangement in fact 
distributes power as would a limited partnership; or 
(2) The partner or venturer is so inexperienced and 
unknowledgeable in business affairs that he is incapable of 
intelligently exercising his partnership or venture powers; or 
                                                                                                                 
 45. 328 U.S. at 298-99; see also United Hous. Found. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 
(“The touchstone is the presence of an investment in a common venture premised on a 
reasonable expectation of profits to be derived from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts 
of others.”) 
 46. Id.  
 47. 643 F.2d at 417. 
 48. SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 483 (5th Cir. 1974) (citing SEC v. 
Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir. 1973)). 
 49. Williamson, 643 F.2d at 424. 
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(3) The partner or venturer is so dependent on some unique 
entrepreneurial or managerial ability of the promoter or manager 
that he cannot replace the manager of the enterprise or otherwise 
exercise meaningful partnership or venture powers.
50
 
The court considers the factors nonexclusively when determining whether 
joint venturers participating in an investment are so dependent on another 
party’s effort that the investment is actually an investment contract.
51
 
B. The Joint Venture/General Partnership Exemption  
A joint venture can generally be described as “an association of persons, 
created by express or implied agreement, who combine their property, 
knowledge, and efforts to carry out a single business venture for the 
purpose of realizing a profit.”
52
 Courts have held that joint ventures, once 
established, continue until there is evidence of termination by the venturing 
parties.
53
 The main difference between a joint venture and a regular 
partnership is the limited scope and duration of a joint venture.  
Another important component of a joint venture is that each member 
owes a fiduciary duty to each of the other members of that joint venture.
54
 
Thus, in a true joint venture one member may become liable to another 
member for property of the venture that has been apportioned for his use.
55
 
This level of liability is not what investors are usually expecting to take on 
when they participate in an oil and gas drilling operation. Therefore, few 
true joint ventures exist in the world of oil and gas investments.  
Typically, a general partnership or joint venture interest is not included 
in the definition of an investment contract.
56
 However, simply labeling an 
investment as a general partnership will not prevent a finding that the 
instrument falls within the jurisdiction of federal securities laws.
57
 Further, 
the Williamson case defines the type of evidence courts should consider 
when determining the expectations of control as they relate to an 
operation’s status as a joint venture.
58
 Williamson directs court to rely on 
                                                                                                                 
 50. Id.  
 51. Id.  
 52. NANCY SAINT-PAUL, SUMMERS OIL AND GAS § 47.3 (3d 2017). 
 53. Lyle Cashion Co. v. McKendrick, 204 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1953); Donnelly v. 
Guthrie, 194 F.2d 164 (5th Cir. 1952). 
 54. De Witt v. Sorenson, 288 F.2d 455, 459-61 (5th Cir. 1961). 
 55. Id.  
 56. Williamson, 645 F.2d at 419-21. 
 57. Forman, 421 U.S. at 848-49. 
 58. Williamson, 645 F.2d at 756-57. 
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the totality of the circumstances surrounding an offer for an investment in 
making a determination of the classification of an investment operation.
59
 In 
other words, courts evaluate whether an interest is a security based on the 




When focusing on substance rather than form, the courts looks at 
representations made by a promoter in marketing an interest and not just the 
legal contracts that underlie the sale of the venture.
61
 Additionally, the court 
considers investment conduct as relevant to determining the intent of the 
parties at the time the agreement was signed.
62
 Further, the acts of the 
involved parties even after the signature of agreements are also relevant to a 
determination of the intent of the parties.
63
 The later participation, or lack 
thereof, of investors sheds light on how the parties regarded their rights and 
status under an agreement at its inception.
64
 
In Youmans v. Simon, the Fifth Circuit stated that there remains a “strong 
presumption that a general partnership or joint venture interest is not a 
security.”
65
 The Youmans court further pushed that “[a] party seeking to 
prove the contrary must bear a heavy burden of proof.”
66
 Therefore, district 
courts generally examine each of the Williamson factors to determine if the 
SEC has met the heavy burden of establishing that the interest sold by a 
defendant was a security.
67
 
While this article seeks to shed light on the disappearance of the joint 
venture exemption in the regulation of oil and gas investment operations, 
there are examples of less commonly used investment models that may 
qualify as joint ventures. For example, an agreement amongst adjoining 
landowners for the recovery of hydrocarbons establishing a lessee-royalty 
owner relationship constitutes a joint venture.
68
 Similarly, a group acting 
together to purchase an oil and gas lease that shares in the losses and gains
69
 
                                                                                                                 
 59. Id.  
 60. Forman, 421 U.S. at 848-49. 
 61. SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 353 (1943). 
 62. Maritan v. Birmingham Props., 875 F.2d 1451, 1458-59 (1989).  
 63. Id. 
 64. Id.  
 65. 791 F.2d 341, 346 (5th Cir. 1986). 
 66. Id. (citing Williamson, 645 F.2d at 424). 
 67.  Sethi, 229 F. Supp. 3d at 533. 
 68. Carroll v. Caldwell, 147 N.E.2d 69, 75 (Ill. 1957). 
 69. These oil and gas operations that actually qualify as joint ventures are typically 
smaller “Mom and Pop” set ups that involve either family members or neighboring 
landowners joining together to develop smaller tracts of land.  
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may also constitute a joint venture.
70
 However, modern securities regulation 
of oil and gas investments, more often than not, involve individuals who 
have not contemplated or exerted action on the management or control of a 
drilling operation. Thus, these courts are highly unlikely to identify these 
investors as participants in a joint venture.  
C. Establishment of a Joint Venture 
Joint ventures have gained popularity in the oil and gas investment sector 
as a way to structure drilling investment schemes.
71
 More investment 
organizers have opted for the joint venture structure because it combines 
the benefit of joining funds while also diluting any economic risk to a 
company.
72
 A joint venture merely involves two or more parties that jointly 
undertake a commercial enterprise, but otherwise maintain their separate 
identities. When one party wants to start a joint venture, they must solicit 
support from one or more other parties to participate.
73
 In the oil and gas 
cases discussed in this paper, support is usually curated by both 
communicating directly with potential investors and the distribution of 
persuasive documents. This sales package will include information about 
the prospective drilling project, including: geological information related to 
the project, data on wells from the surrounding areas, potential production 
amounts, estimated costs of drilling and completing a well, and information 
on how the operator acquired the right to drill (lease agreement, forced 
pooling, etc).
74
 The operator typically provides this information through the 
use of several documents discussed in more detail below. The purpose of 
the sales package is to give potential investors as much information as is 
reasonably necessary to allow the parties to make an informed decision 
about whether or not to invest.
75
 This information contained in the sales 
package may be presented more or less specifically depending on the 
targeted potential investors experience level with oil and gas projects.  
The relationship between investors and an operation is solidified through 
the signing of a joint venture agreement. A joint venture is based on either 
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an express or implied agreement.
76
 Regardless, the agreement should be in 
writing and should state the nature of the parties’ relationship.
77
 Further, the 
rights, duties, and obligations of all parties involved should be clearly 
expressed.
78
 When an agreement is silent as to certain rights or obligations, 




A number of documents are involved in eliciting investor participation in 
a joint venture, including private placement memoranda (“PPMs”), joint 
venture agreements (“JVAs”), and confidential information memoranda 
(“CIMs”).
80
 Understanding the purposes and use of these documents is 
important because courts often look to these offering documents as 
evidence as to the status of an investment operation. PPMs are detailed 
documents that contain a summary of the investment operations. When 
involving oil and gas, PPMs often cover a number of topics, such as the 
terms of the offering, risk factors involved in the investment, investor 
participation in costs and revenues, management of the operation, and 
potential conflicts of interest. A JVA typically contains more detailed 
information about the specific operations of the venture. Examples of topics 
included in a JVA might include how investor money will be used to 
further the operation or information on daily operations. A CIM also 
provides information on the operation of the venture but may also provide 
confidential details that the venture organizers do not want the general 
public to know about.  
D. Penalties for Failure to Comply with Federal Securities Regulations  
The inquiry into whether an oil and gas interest is a security is important 
because it is the question upon which civil and criminal liability hinges. 
The unauthorized sale of securities is a violation of Sections 5(a) and 5(c) 
of the Securities Act.
81
 Section 5(a) makes it unlawful to use the U.S. mail 
to transport “any such security for the purpose of sale or for delivery after 
sale.”
82
 Section 5(c) states that it is unlawful for any individual to utilize 
“interstate commerce or of the mails to offer to sell or offer to buy through 
the use or medium of any prospectus or otherwise any security, unless a 
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registration statement has been filed as to such security . . . .”
83
 To establish 
a prima facie case for 5(a) and 5(c) violations, the SEC must prove: (1) 
defendants offered or sold securities; (2) the securities were not registered 
as required by Section 5; and (3) defendants used the United States mail or 
interstate commerce to offer or sell the securities.
84
 Once the SEC has 
satisfied its burden, the defendant then bears the burden of proving that he 
or she qualifies for an exemption from the registration requirement.
85
  
Further, Section 15(a) of the Exchange Act makes it unlawful for a 
broker who is not registered to use the U.S. mail or interstate commerce to 
induce the sale of a security. The act defines a broker as “any person 
engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities for the 
account of others.”
86
 The SEC asserted that hiring sales agents to contact 
potential investors and compensating them with transaction-based earnings 
is an example of acting as a broker.
87
 The Act does not define the term 
“engaged in business,” but courts have defined it generally as the act of 
buying and selling securities.
88
 Also, undefined by the Act, the court 
considers a number of factors when determining if a party was “effecting 
transactions.”
89
 These factors include: (1) whether investors were solicited 
to buy securities; (2) whether the defendant was involved in negotiations 
between the issuer and the investors; and (3) whether the party received a 
transaction-related compensation or a salary.
90
  
Section 20(e) of the Exchange Act allows the SEC to bring a civil suit 
against any individual who knowingly or recklessly provides assistance to 
another person in violation of the statute. This expands the reach of the SEC 
beyond investment managers to other parties involved in management, such 
as promoters or organizers.  
The SEC has sought a number of penalties in its suits against investment 
managers, including: (1) prohibiting defendants from acting as a director of 
any issuer of a class of securities; (2) permanently enjoining defendants 
from soliciting investors to purchase securities; (3) prohibiting defendant’s 
from participating in any oil and gas related security offering as a manager, 
                                                                                                                 
 83. Id.  
 84. Dennis v. Gen. Imaging, Inc., 918 F.2d 496, 503-04 (5th Cir. 1990). 
 85. SEC v. Cont’l Tobacco Co., 463 F.2d 137, 155-56 (5th Cir. 1972). 
 86. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4). 
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administrator, promoter, finder, consultant, agent, or issuer; (4) ordering 
defendants to pay an amount equal to funds and benefits obtained illegally, 
plus prejudgment interest on that amount; and (5) ordering defendants to 
pay additional civil monetary penalties as the court sees fit.
91
  
Regarding monetary penalties and fines, Section 20(e) of the Securities 
Act and Section 21(d)(3) of the Exchange Act authorize courts to assess 
civil money penalties. Monetary fines are designed to serve as deterrents 
against future violations, both for the accused and the public. When 
determining fines, the court considers the following factors: (1) the 
egregiousness of the defendant’s conduct; (2) the degree of scienter on the 
part of the defendant; (3) whether the defendant’s conduct created 
substantial losses or the risk of substantial losses to other parties; (4) 
whether the defendant’s conduct was isolated or recurrent; and (5) whether 
the penalty should be reduced due to the defendant’s demonstrated current 
and future financial condition.
92
  
The SEC retains broad authority to seek injunctive relief, such as the 
suspension of investment operations of a company. Congress enacted the 
Investment Advisers Act to monitor and regulate the activities of 
individuals who participate in the sale of securities.
93
 The Investment 
Adviser’s Act permits the SEC to bring civil injunctive actions in federal 
district courts to seek relief against any individual who has violated or is 
about to violate the Act.
94
 In determining whether to grant injunctive relief, 
courts have looked at whether the relief was necessary to prevent future 
violations. Courts have inquired into a variety of factors, including whether 
the violation was an isolated incident, what degree of scienter was involved, 
whether the defendant shows remorse for their actions, and whether the 
defendant’s occupation places him in a position where he could commit 
future violations. 
E. Application of the Howey Test and Williamson Factors to Oil & Gas 
Courts have applied the Howey test to oil and gas investment operations 
to determine if an investment scheme is a true joint venture or not. The 
third prong of the Howey test is supplemented by the three factors from 
Williamson to determine if there was an expectation that profits would be 
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obtained from the efforts of individuals other than the investor.
95
 As the 
analysis below shows, there are certain aspects unique to the oil and gas 
business that make it nearly impossible for operators within the drilling 
industry to sustain joint ventures. 
1. Williamson Factor 1: Lack of power in the hands of venturers  
The first Williamson factor concerns the question of whether there is an 
agreement among the parties that leaves so little power in the hands of the 
partner or venturer that the arrangement in fact distributes power as would a 
limited partnership.
96
 To determine the extent of the venturers’ power, 
courts look at post-investment activities.
97
 Court’s examine these post-
investment activities because focusing on merely the terms of the 
partnership agreement would conflict with the substance over form rule 
from Howey.
98
 This conflict would be an “invitation to artful manipulation 
of business forms to avoid investment contract status.”
99
  
The courts have refused to accept merely power for venturers on paper, 
without further proof, as evidence of ample venturer control to qualify as an 
investment contract.
100
 Under the general canons of construction, courts 
give effect to the manifested intent expressed in a contract purporting to 
create a joint venture.
101
 However, if the circumstances dictate that the 
arrangement between the parties creates a status different from the language 
in the contract, the court will not allow the parties’ designation to control.
102
 
In SEC v. Arcturus Corp., the SEC filed a civil enforcement action 
alleging that two Texas corporations had offered and sold interests in oil 
and gas drilling projects called joint ventures, rather than security interests, 
in an attempt to avoid the regulation of the SEC.
103
 Each of these oil and 
gas offerings had a JVA that provided details on the structure of the venture 
and the delegation of powers and duties.
104
 The JVA granted venturers 
voting rights as well as the ability to call a meeting.
105
 These voting rights 
included the ability to remove the managing venturer and amend the terms 
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 96. Id. at 401.   
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 98. SEC v. Merch. Capital, LLC, 483 F.3d 747, 760 (11th Cir. 2007). 
 99. Id. (citing Williamson 645 F.2d at 418). 
 100. SEC v. Shields, 744 F.3d 633, 643 (10th Cir. 2014).  
 101.  FRANCIS M. DOUGHERTY ET AL., 55A TEX. JUR., OIL AND GAS § 557 (3d ed. 2018). 
 102. Id. 
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of the original JVA.
106
 The court, however, declined to accept the JVA as 
evidence that the venturers had any actual power.
107
 While the agreement 
may have vested certain voting powers in the ventures, its voting 
requirements undid that conferring of rights. The JVA required a 60% 
interest vote in order to remove the managing venturer of the operation.
108
 
While 60% may seem like a fair amount on paper, logistically this threshold 
proved nearly impossible to meet because of the inability of investors to 
contact one another. As was the case in Arcturus, oil and gas investment 
schemes often involve investors that are scattered across the country.
109
 It is 
hard for oil and gas operations to defend against the first Williamson factor 
because of the logistics of the business involving investors that are spread 
across the country. Oil and gas investors are often scattered across the 
country because projects tend to be concentrated in certain geographical 
areas. It can be difficult for these investors to arrange to meet and discuss 
the management of the operation. 
In addition to investors being scattered across the country, 
communication is also difficult because of the lack of access investors have 
to information about co-venturers. Investors may have the power to 
organize and vote on paper, but they may not actually be able to do so in 
practice if they do not have the ability to contact other investors. Investment 
schemes may choose to restrict access to the organization’s books or 
records for a number of reasons. This concealment of information leads to 
venturers’ inability to contact one another so that they may exercise their 
powers as investors. For example, in SEC v. Sethi Petroleum, the company 
charged with selling securities had solicited investors from across the 
United States with no prior relationship to one another, and did not provide 
the investors with access to records about one another.
110
 The court allowed 
these facts to establish that the investors had no ability to exercise the 
powers they had been proscribed on paper because they had no information 
about other investors that could be used to contact others.
111
 Sethi shows 
that a court will not allow mere powers on paper to serve as evidence that 
the first Williamson factor is inapplicable. Instead, investors must have a 
means by which to remain in contact with another.  
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The exact level of involvement needed by investors to ensure an 
operation’s status as a joint venture is a gray area. While investors, need 
real power to exert control of an operation, it is hard to state how much 
control is necessary to meet that threshold. In SEC v. Couch, the court was 
displeased with the fact that the defendants did not transfer title to interest 
in any of the wells to the investors.
112
 The SEC has gone as far as to 
insinuate that investors in a joint venture should have input on which wells 
are drilled or regarding if a wildcat well
113
 should be drilled on a particular 
tract at all.
114
 Further, the SEC has suggested investors should have input on 
how operators spend and allocate investment proceeds.
115
 This level of 
input could require investment operators to consult investors at almost 
every part of the drilling process. While this input would give investors 
control and purport to create a joint venture, that level of participation is 
almost always disadvantageous to all parties because of the investor’s lack 
of knowledge and the need for an operation to have consolidated 
management. 
2. Williamson Factor 2: Inexperience and lack of knowledge of 
venturers  
The second Williamson factor considers the question of whether the 
partner or venturer is so inexperienced and unknowledgeable in business 
affairs that they are incapable of intelligently exercising their partnership or 
venture powers.
116
 This factor is also nearly impossible to defend against 
for oil and gas operations. In order to determine if this factor is established, 
Courts look to whether the investors were knowledgeable and experienced 
in the particular industry the venture involved.
117
 This test derives from the 
Fifth Circuit’s decision in Long v. Shultz Cattle.
118
 In Shultz, the court 
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 113. A wild cat well is a well drilled in area that is not previously known to be an oil 
field. The fugacious nature of oil and gas often requires that wells are drilled in areas where 
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 114. SEC v. Petroforce Energy, LLC, No. 1:17-cv-00698, 2017 WL 3139977 (W.D. Tex. 
July 24, 2017) (Trial Pleading). 
 115. Id. 
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looked at whether cattle-feeding consulting agreements were unregistered 
securities.
119
 The Fifth Circuit refused to weigh heavily the fact that 
investors in the case were experienced and successful business venturers. 
Instead, the court focused on whether the investors had specific experience 
in the cattle business.
120
 
Shultz shows that courts must consider the specific nature of the business 
the securities are sold within. The inquiry of the court is whether the 
investors are so unknowledgeable and inexperienced in a particular area of 
business that it is more likely they would “be relying solely on the efforts of 
the promoter to obtain their profits.”
121
 Courts have often held oil and gas 
investment schemes to an even higher standard, requiring not only that 
investors are experienced in oil and gas, but that they have drilling-specific 
experience.
122
 Just as general business knowledge is not enough to qualify 
an investor as informed, it follows that general oil and gas knowledge might 
not be sufficient satisfy the informed standard set by Williamson. Oil and 
gas is a highly specialized field that most individuals are not familiar with, 
especially the unique components of drilling. Most individuals looking for 
operations to invest in do not have any oil and gas experience or knowledge 
about the field. Therefore, it can be difficult for a group of investors to all 
be both knowledgeable and experienced enough to defeat this fact. 
                                                                                                                 
not it is a security. This idea of substance over form is again evidenced by the fact that the 
court in Long was willing to find that cattle-feeding consulting agreements were unregistered 
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 121. SEC v. Merch. Capital, LLC, 483 F.3d 747, 762 (11th Cir. 2007). 
 122. To a lay person, the difference in general oil and gas knowledge and drilling 
experience may seem like nothing. However, just as the oil and gas industry is highly 
specialized, so are the subsections of the industry, such as drilling. Oil and gas development 
is often separated into three sections: upstream, midstream, and downstream. Drilling is 
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In addition to investors being knowledgeable, it is also important for 
investment operators to be experienced in the oil and gas industry. The SEC 
has been quick to note whether or not the party had oil and gas experience 
when accusing an individual of acting as an unregistered broker.
123
 In 
especially competitive areas of oil and gas production, the manager’s 
knowledge might require experience in the purported area of development. 
While no law currently requires investment managers to be experienced to 
maintain their joint venture status, the SEC seems to increasingly include it 
as a factor when deciding which investment operations to prosecute for 
violations.  
Courts have been especially reluctant to accept as joint ventures 
operations where organizer targeted investors using cold calls. Many 
smaller investments operations solicit participation in oil and gas drilling 
schemes through use of lead lists. In Shields, the Tenth Circuit accepted the 
marketing of oil and gas interests by use of cold calls as evidence that 
investors were so inexperienced as to not be able to exercise their venture 
powers.
124
 Courts have continued to hold that when promoters make offers 
for securities through the use of hundreds of cold calls to investors with 
little to no oil and gas experience, one can conclude that the investors were 
so inexperienced to the level that they are incapable of exercising their 
powers in the venture.
125
 
This factor concerning the knowledge and experience of venturers has 
been important in distinguishing between sophisticated and unsophisticated 
investors, and its impact has been the source of controversy for decades.
126
 
There has long been an “industry deal” in the oil and gas business involving 
the purchase of working interests by sophisticated investors.
127
 After testing 
suitable land for oil development, an operator might prepare a sales package 
to distribute to companies who have had prior dealings in oil and gas 
exploration.
128
 Once the organization reviews the sales package, the 
company decides whether to purchase a working interest in the drilling 
project.
129
 These industry partners naturally have a better understanding of 
the complexities of the oil and gas business. Therefore, lawyers have 
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argued that these sophisticated and knowledgeable parties that invest in oil 
and gas prospects do not need the protection of federal securities laws.
130
 
However, while these investors may be knowledgeable about investing in 
drilling operations, investment agreements may still not qualify as joint 
ventures if the remaining two Williamson factors are not met. This idea 
raises questions of whether an investor deserves protections even in the 
event of failure of the other factors because of their prior knowledge about 
the industry. As discussed, the Federal Securities Acts may give rise to a 
right of recession for an operator’s failure to register an offering in a 
drilling prospect as a security. While historically the oil and gas industry 
has not viewed these transactions as securities, they likely fall within the 
definition of a security and may warrant registration with the SEC unless 
exempt. 
131
 Thus, the ability of the operators to obtain the status of a joint 
venture, and thus be exempt from registration, is important to operations 
involving sophisticated investors as well.  
3. Williamson Factor 3: Venturers’ dependence on abilities of 
defendants  
The third Williamson considers the question of whether the partner or 
venturer is so dependent on some unique entrepreneurial or managerial 
ability of the promoter or manager that they cannot replace the manager of 
the enterprise or otherwise exercise meaningful partnership or venture 
powers.
132
 Courts have deemed an agreement to be an investment contract if 
the investors have no practical alternative to the managing venturer or they 
are unable to completely exercise their powers as venturers.
133
 A dependent 
relationship exists when the investors of an operation rely on the “managing 
partner’s unusual business experience and ability in running that particular 
business.”
134
 The Williamson court noted that even a knowledgeable partner 
in an operation may be left without a reasonable alternative when there is 
not a sound replacement for the manager.
135
 The court further reasoned that 
in these situations a legal right of control has limited value if partners have 
no choice but to rely on the manger’s abilities in order to continue the 
operations of the venture.
136
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The ability to remove a managing venturer is considered one of the 
hallmarks of a joint venture.
137
 Many joint venture agreements vest in the 
managing venturer complete power over drilling operations. While this may 
not seem to be in the best interest of the venturers, it may actually be 
required in order to commence drilling operations. Oil and gas operations 
often call for power to be centralized in the hands of a single individual.
138
 
For example, contractors may not want to do business with an enterprise 
that is frequently changing its head of drilling operations.  
Another factor that courts have considered as a sign of venturer 
dependence on managing directors is when venturers have limited or 
nonexistent access to funds.
139
 In Arcturus, the defendant held venturers’ 
money in an account that was controlled exclusively by the defendant 
managers of the investment operation.
140
 Lack of access to accounts limits 
the ability of venturers to remove the managing venturer. Even if the 
venturers were able to vote the managing venturers out, they would have no 
access to funds, and thus the joint venture would be at risk of failing 
because it would lack assets to fund further drilling.
141
 Thus, the lack of 
access to the funds or assets of an operation creates a picture of venturers’ 
complete dependence on the managing venturer.  
In considering the third Williamson factor, courts may also contemplate 
the representations made by promoters or others with the goal of inducing 
reliance upon their unique abilities as managers.
142
 In Sethi, the court 
looked at statements promoters made while contacting potential 
investors.
143
 For example, the cold call regime made promises that the 
operations would produce over one million barrels of oil a month and that 
investors would immediately begin receiving revenue checks with return 
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rates at 30-60% per year.
144
 Further, in the PPM promoters touted their 
experience and ability to produce profits in the oil and gas industry.
145
 
Additionally, the operation peddled its ability to make a profit in the 
exclusive Bakken Shale market.
146
 More specifically, the Executive 
Summary stated that the Bakken Shale had already been monopolized by 
major oil and gas companies, and thus the ability of the company to drill in 
the region would be a unique benefit to investors.
147
 Ultimately, the court 
agreed with the SEC’s argument that the company’s purported experience 
in an exclusive market, coupled with the illustrious promises made by 
promoters showed that the investors were without a reasonable alternative 
management option.
148
 Sethi shows that courts will not take lightly the fact 
that promoters have made illustrious promises, and instead may weigh these 
statements heavily as evidence that the investors were dependent on the 
promoters.  
Further, the first Williamson factor covering lack of power in the hands 
of the venturers overlaps in concept with the third factor. When investors 
lack power in an investment operation, it is often due to their dependence 
on the management of the scheme. In SEC v. Mieka, the court accepted the 
fact that the investors had expressly delegated the management of the 
operations of the joint venture to the company as evidence that the 
venturers were dependent on the defendant managers.
149
 Similarly, in 
Arcturus the facts of the case showed that the venturers delegated all 
powers related to the day-to-day management of the venture to the 
operations manager as a managing venturer.
150
 The investors in that case 
also delegated “the power to act on behalf of, sign or bind the Joint 
Venture” or other venturers with the managing venturer through the 
language in the JVA.
151
 Further, the agreement in that case vested in the 
manager “full and plenary power” over drilling operations, and allowed the 
manager of the operation to either “retain or act as operator(s)” for the 
purposes of testing, drilling and completing any wells.
152
 The court again 
found that these facts together illustrate that the venturers were dependent 
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on the managing venturer because he controlled all aspects of the drilling 
operations, ultimately leaving investors powerless.
153
 This hesitation to 
allow a managing venturer to control drilling operations further shows how 
difficult it is for oil and gas operations to defend against this factor. If a 
central party is not allowed to have general power over drilling, it may be 
hard for the operation to have direction. Without a coherent direction, it 
may be hard for an operation to be successful.  
F. State Security Acts 
While this comment focuses on federal security provisions, it is 
important to note that additional registration with a state security agency 
may be required.
154
 In Texas an aggrieved investor may have a claim under 
the Texas Securities Act for the sale of an unregistered security.
155
 
Understanding the implications of state securities laws is important because 
more oil and gas interests may fall within the definition of a security under 
a state act than under the federal definition.
156
 For instance, the Texas 
Securities Act includes many oil and gas interests that are explicitly 
excluded from the definition of a federal security.
157
 Additionally, other 
important litigation factors, such as a statute of limitations, may be different 
under a state act than under federal law.
158
  
V. Looking Forward: The Future of the Joint Venture Exemption 
This rapidly emerging case law will likely require the legal community 
to react to developments in oil and gas securities regulation. Attorneys are 
at the front line when it comes to advising investment organizers with how 
to set up and structure their investment operations. A number of factors 
currently affect an attorney’s ability to advise a client coherently on 
                                                                                                                 
 153. Id.  
 154. Generally, a party who purchases an oil and gas interest might have a cause of 
action under state and federal securities laws in Texas if they: (1) purchase an oil and gas 
interest that required registration but was not registered; or (2) are the victim of a 
misrepresentation by a promoter. When dealing with the first claim, federal and Texas laws 
address the type of injury similarly. However, when a claim involves misrepresentation or an 
omission by the oil and gas operation, many parties opt to bring claims under Texas state 
law instead of federal laws because Texas’s Blue Sky laws include more oil and gas interests 
than federal securities laws. This differentiation shows why it is important for attorneys and 
clients alike to be informed on securities regulation at both the federal and state level. 
 155. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. Art. 581-33 (West 2001).  
 156. Ebaugh, supra note 26, at 58. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
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whether or not an operator’s classification excuses its compliance with 
certain requirements from regulatory security agencies. 
A. Need for Consensus in the Legal Community 
There is a clear need for consensus on the question of whether the joint 
venture exemption is available to oil and gas investment operations. 
Attorneys who work in the oil and gas securities sector are often charged 
with advising these oil and gas companies as well as promoters who seek to 
procure funds from investors. Included in this advisement is usually a 
suggestion on whether to register with the SEC. Currently, there is 
disagreement in the legal community as to whether the joint venture 
exemption is still valid in oil and gas practice. Again, while in theory the 
courts have upheld this exemptions for a number of industries, the quirks of 
the oil and gas business have made it seemingly more difficult for the 
exemption to apply to the industry. This disagreement in the legal 
community can be harmful to clients because it creates the opportunity for 
situations to arise that open up investment scheme operators to liability. 
Therefore, the legal community should come together to agree upon one or 
more methods of better clarifying what oil and gas investment operations 
are exempt from registration with the SEC based on joint venture status. 
B. The Significance of Kinlaw  
The Kinlaw case discussed at the beginning of this comment spurred the 
common use of the joint venture exemption because the court found in 
favor of unregistered oil and gas investment promoters. While it would 
seem intuitive that attorneys could lean on this holding to help support their 
clients, that has not been the case. Defendants have attempted to defend 
their practice using this case with little luck.
159
 For example, in Arcturus, 
defendants wrote in their reply brief in support of their motion for summary 
judgment that the Kinlaw case featured very similar facts and was 
comparable to theirs.
160
 Defendants noted that both cases featured similar 
JVAs, distribution plans, legal structures, CIMs, questionnaires, and other 
pertinent facts.
161
 The promoters further argued that they had structured 
their own agreements based on the arrangement that had been approved in 
Kinlaw.
162
 Further, defendants argued that they had imposed requirements 
on membership in the joint venture that had even exceeded those in 
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 Still, as previously discussed, the court found that the SEC had 
established proof that the investments in question were securities that 
needed to be registered.
164
 In fact, the court does not even discuss Kinlaw in 
the Arcturus opinion.
165
 This treatment of Kinlaw shows that courts have 
disregarded any significance it once held. Thus, defendants should not 
depend on Kinlaw as a strong source of authority when arguing that an 
operation qualifies as a joint venture.  
C. Maintaining Joint Venture Status 
If attorneys are to continue directing quasi-brokers of oil and gas 
interests to utilize the joint venture exemption, they must lay out exactly 
how the managers are to comply with each of the three Williamson factors. 
As to the first factor, investment managers should be directed to continue 
gathering investors from one region of the country, or preferably, one state. 
The solicitation of investors from one region would make it more difficult 
for the SEC to attack an operation as only offering sham or illusory powers 
to its venturers.
166
 In addition to sticking to one region or when gathering 
investors from one region is not feasible, managing venturers should put 
investors into contact with one another as soon as possible. Further, the 
managing venturer should ensure that they do not restrict investor access to 
information regarding one another. This can be done in a variety of ways, 
such as by compiling a secure database of all of the investors’ information 
and giving access to each investor.  
As to the second Williamson factor, attorneys should direct managing 
venturers to refrain from the use of cold calls. While the use of cold calls 
may technically be permitted in a joint venture operation, the courts have 
recently viewed them as strong evidence that an interest purported to be a 
joint venture is in reality an investment contract.
167
 Managers should 
instead try to solicit investments from individuals they know or have some 
professional connection with in the oil and gas industry. To ensure an 
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 164. Arcturus, 171 F. Supp. 3d at 531. 
 165. Id. 
 166. The SEC has a limited ability to attack certain interstate transactions. The 1933 Act 
exempts certain intrastate transactions from disclosure to the SEC if: (1) the security is sold 
within a single state or territory; and (2) the issuer of said security is a resident and “doing 
business” within said state. See 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11). The SEC defines “doing business” 
as the issuer deriving at least 80% of its consolidated gross revenues from operations within 
the state, having at least 80% of assets in the state, and using at least 80% of its net proceeds 
from sales within the state. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.147.  
 167. Sethi, 229 F. Supp. 3d at 536; Mieka, 259 F. Supp. 3d at 558. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018
1336 Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal [Vol. 3 
  
 
investment scheme’s status as a joint venture, organizers should try to focus 
not only on individuals with oil and gas experience, but more specifically 
individuals with experience in the area of drilling and production. Focusing 
on investors with specific drilling experience clears some of the doubt, if 
present, that the investors are not experienced in the business of the venture.  
The third Williamson factor is arguably the most difficult element to 
comply with for managers of investment operations. Oil and gas drilling 
projects often require power to be vested in the hand of sole individuals. 
For example, contractors may require one individual to remain as the holder 
of the lease, or listed as the operator of the well. Therefore, suggestions on 
compliance with this Williamson factor can leave attorneys in a problematic 
position when offering advice to clients.  
For starters, it is critical that venturers retain access to the investment 
funds. These funds should be kept in a separate account and not comingled 
with any other monies. Keeping the money open to investors is a clearly 
difficult task because of the logistics of allowing over fifty venturers at 
times to rescind their funds as they please, and subsequently threaten the 
stability of the operation. However, allowing venturers to have access to the 
account is important because it ensures that any new managing venturer 
will be able to access the joint venture’s assets to fund drilling operations. 
It is also in the best interest of an investment operation to avoid 
monopolized areas of oil and gas production, such as the Bakken Shale or 
the Permian Basin. These areas that are dominated by several oil and gas 
operations often require extensive experience and connections to enter into 
an exclusive market. To courts, this exclusivity creates the appearance that 
the venturers are dependent on the managing venturer, and thus without a 
reasonable alternative option as to a new managing venturer.
168
 Managers 
of investment operations must also walk a fine line when drafting their 
PPM for potential investors. Courts have considered PPM’s that boast about 
access to an exclusive market as evidence that the investors were without 
power to remove the managing venturer.
169
  
Managers will likely have to show that venturers have a certain amount 
of control over drilling operations. This control is the most substantial piece 
of proof to show that investors continue to maintain the ability to replace 
the managing venturer of a drilling operation. A JVA that purports to grant 
full power over the drilling operations of a project violates this ability by 
                                                                                                                 
 168. Sethi, 229 F. Supp. 3d at 537.  
 169. Arcturus, 171 F. Supp. 3d at 529-30. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol3/iss6/2
2018] The Death of the Joint Venture Exemption 1337 
 
 
removing the power of investors to affect the direction of the drilling 
operation.  
While theoretically an oil and gas investment operation may be able to 
retain its joint venture status in limited circumstances based on the 
foregoing suggestions, it is apparent that the potential for misstep is nearly 
imminent. The courts have continued to side with the SEC, resulting in case 
law that supports any future allegation the agency makes against oil and gas 
drilling operations. This case law shows that a number of common practices 
involved in the solicitation and management of investors are evidence of an 
operation’s false status as a joint venture. The purpose of this article is to 
demonstrate the difficulties, and potential liabilities, associated with 
attempting to maintain a joint venture in the oil and gas industry. 
D. Exempting Sophisticated Investors 
 A greater emphasis should be placed on the second Williamson factor 
involving investor knowledge and experience. Regardless of whether the 
first or third Williamson factor is met, operators partnering with 
sophisticated investors should be exempt from registering the SEC.
170
 As 
pertaining to the oil and gas industry, sophisticated parties should not be 
allowed to use securities laws as insurance against the risk of a transaction. 
When a knowledgeable and experienced party agrees to assume the risk of 
investing in a drilling prospect, they should not have the opportunity to 
back out by claiming that the transaction in void because of the operator’s 
failure to register the investment as a security with the SEC. A significant 
amount of funding for oil and gas projects is generated from sophisticated 
investors with knowledge of the complexities and volatile nature of the oil 
and gas industry.
171
 To allow these investors to walk away from deals 
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protection. The 1933 Act provides that transactions are exempt from registration if they do 
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would impair the ability of operators to obtain funding for drilling projects, 
ultimately impairing the development of production of natural resources.
172
 
A party who has the ability to accurately assess the risk of a drilling 
operation based on its experience in the oil and gas industry should not 
enjoy a free ride on an investment based on federal securities laws. The 
specific realties of the oil and gas industry must be considered when 




 To accomplish this objective, Congress should consider drafting an 
exemption into federal securities laws relating to the experience of oil and 
gas investors in the industry. Until 2003, the state of Oklahoma had a 
statute that exempted industry deals in oil and gas from the reach of state 
security laws. The pertinent section of the statute read: 
Any interest in oil, gas, or mineral lease except that transactions 
involving leases or interests therein, between parties, each of 
whom is engaged in the business of exploring for or producing 
oil and gas or other valuable minerals as an ongoing business, 
and the execution of oil and gas leases by land, mineral and 
royalty owners in favor of a party or parties engaged in the 
business of exploring for or producing oil and gas or other 
valuable minerals shall be deemed not to involve a security.
174
 
A similar exception should be codified into current federal securities laws 
in order to protect one of the working traditions of investment in the oil and 
gas industry. An exception would allow for investors in need of protection 
from security laws to have it but require sophisticated investors to use 
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 173. This article makes the contention that sophisticated oil and gas investors should be 
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common law remedies. This distinction between knowledgeable and 
unknowledgeable investors is important because it allows for an acceptable 
industry practice to continue.  
E. Statutory Clarification  
 In order to avoid lawyers being placed in the uncomfortable position 
of giving conflicting legal advice, the securities statutes should be amended 
to clarify the definition a “security.” Further, these securities acts should be 
amended to clarify exceptions specific to the act. In addition to an 
amendment exempting operations concerning sophisticated investors from 
registration, other exceptions should also be carved out if deemed 
necessary. For example, an amendment should be drafted to specifically 
define the qualifications an investment operation must have to qualify as a 
joint venture. While it is a notable point that the common law has 
developed a definition for a joint venture, at a minimum this law should be 
codified into federal law. This codification would allow for attorneys to 
have a more specific source to point to when offering advice, thereby 
dismissing some of the confusion currently present in the legal community. 
Further, a federal definition would likely result in a greater consensus in the 
legal community about which investment operations are required to register 
and which operations may continue to operate free of SEC regulation. 
Regardless of whether the definition was crafted to favor the SEC or 
investment managers, greater consensus in the legal community would 
benefit all parties involved.   
 One source of inspiration for revamping the federal securities code 
might be the Texas State Securities Board’s guidelines. The agency 
provides specific information on the registration of oil and gas programs.
175
 
Under the Texas code, most individuals who serves as an officer or director 
of promoters who sell interests in an oil and gas operation must be licensed 
as broker-dealers.
176
 Further, these officers cannot be paid commission in 
any form related to the sale of the interests.
177
 These broker-dealers are 
responsible for ensuring that oil and gas interests in an operation are only 
sold to appropriate purchasers.
178
 If the federal government were able to 
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codify a similar section into its code concerning registration of oil and gas 
promoters, much of the confusion arising out of recent case law would 
likely be resolved.  
F. Continued Registration with the SEC 
 In the absence of change, either in legal advising or statutory 
definitions, investment operations in oil and gas should err on the safe side 
by registering with the SEC and following the Commission’s rules. 
Lawyers should advise operators seeking external sources of funds for oil 
and gas operations to secure both state and federal registration. While 
discussion about securities regulation usually focuses on the implication of 
case law challenging the joint venture status of operations in federal courts, 
operators often must also adhere to state registration requirements.  
In conveying the importance of registration, attorneys should make 
several of the following points. First, put simply, there is a strong argument 
that federal and/or state law require registration of an operation. While the 
statute may not be clear, federal courts have put out an increasing amount 
of case law explaining when the law requires registration. This increasing 
amount of case law leaves little room for investors to manipulate the system 
by falsely claiming exempt status for their operations. Second, because of 
the increase in use of collectively generated funds to fuel oil and gas 
operations, authorities at both the federal and state level have increased 
their enforcement efforts. As more investors are at risk of falling pawn to 
malevolent investment organizers, the SEC will likely continue to come 
after operations who seek to avoid registration.  The increasing amount of 
cases coming out of federal district courts illustrates the determination of 
the SEC to hunt down fraudulent joint venture schemes. Third, registering 
with either the SEC or the relative state agency, while possibly expensive in 
up-front costs, is relatively inexpensive when considering the potential fines 
and litigation costs associated with violations of securities laws. Whereas 
the cost of registering is not by any means a simple or inexpensive one, 
litigating with the SEC is by no means cheap either. Finally, compliance 
with security regulations is most often to the benefit of the operator because 
fulfilment of requirements protects the operator from being penalized on 
mere technicalities.
179
 An operator has a much greater chance of success 
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when confronted with an accusation from the SEC when they have 
complied with these requirements.
180
  
While the process of registering might be somewhat taxing to an 
outsider, Congress has worked to simplify the process. Congress has 
delegated the responsibility of registering brokers and their employees to 
the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD).
181
 NASD is a self-
regulatory organization that acts under the SEC’s oversight and is funded 
by members of the organization.
182
 Once an individual becomes licensed 
with a NASD-member broker-dealer, that person is approved to sell 
securities under federal law.
183
 The NASD requirements for licensure 
include passing both a background check and an exam.
184
 Individuals who 
are specifically interested in selling oil and gas securities can take either the 
Series 7 exam covering general securities representation or the Series 22 
exam covering direct participation program limited representatives.
185
 All 





The disappearance of the joint venture as an exemption to the SEC 
registration requirement in the oil and gas investment industry is apparent. 
Cases like Arcturus and Sethi are just a few examples of the many decisions 
coming of federal district courts in Texas. Further, the SEC has continued 
to file charges against more oil and gas operations for their failure to 
properly register investments as securities. Additionally, when heard in 
court, judges are crushing the operations with summary judgment motions. 
Judges have relied on the mounds of case law created by the SEC in the 
past few years. The SEC’s persistence in attacking investment schemes has 
made fighting charges on these counts an uphill battle for operators who fail 
to register.  
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The recent securities regulation cases emerging from federal courts in 
Texas have illustrated the reluctance of courts to grant investment 
operations the joint venture status. The SEC shows no signs of letting up. 
As the SEC continues to grind out mounds of case law in its favor, the 
operator standard for proving a joint venture exists is only raised higher. 
The importance of lawyers understanding the ramifications of securities 
dealings cannot be understated. Operators who fail to adhere to federal 
security law requirements face potentially severe penalties from the SEC. 
The potential for penalty should be worrisome to the legal community, 
especially when there is not a clear consensus on whether or not the joint 
venture exemption is still available as a defense. Attorney’s practicing in 
both securities and oil and gas law should work to affect adequate outcomes 
for their clients involved in these specialized investment operations. 
Lawyers in most cases should recommend to their clients involved in the 
oil and gas drilling industry to register their investment operations whether 
or not they think they qualify as joint ventures. The cost of failing to 
register, whether in litigation costs or fines imposed by the SEC, almost 
always outweighs the initial cost to register and comply with SEC 
requirements. A simple cost-benefit analysis should lead even the chanciest 
operator to register.  
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